A Complete Symbolic Bisimilarity for an Extended Spi Calculus  by Borgström, Johannes
A Complete Symbolic Bisimilarity for an
Extended Spi Calculus
Johannes Borgstro¨m1
Department of Software Engineering and Theoretical Computer Science,
Technische Universita¨t Berlin, Germany
Abstract
Several symbolic notions of bisimilarity have been deﬁned for the spi calculus and the applied pi calculus.
In this paper, we treat a spi calculus with a general constructor-destructor message algebra, and deﬁne a
symbolic bisimilarity that is both sound and complete with respect to its concrete counterpart.
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The spi calculus, proposed by Abadi and Gordon [4] for the modelling and formal
veriﬁcation of cryptographic protocols, is an extension of the pi calculus [18] with
cryptographic operators and operations. In this paper, we work in an extended spi
calculus where the message algebra permits arbitrary constructors, and destructors
with unique applicability.
As seen in for instance [4,13], many correctness properties for cryptographic pro-
tocols are naturally expressed through equivalences between certain process terms.
To verify security properties expressed in this style, we need to choose a notion of
equivalence. Contextual equivalences—two terms are related if they behave in the
same way in all contexts—are attractive because the quantiﬁcation over all con-
texts directly captures the intuition of an unknown attacker expressible within the
spi calculus.
Direct proofs of contextual equivalences are notoriously hard [4] due to the re-
quirement of inﬁnitary quantiﬁcations (usually quantiﬁcations over inﬁnitely many
process contexts). Unfortunately, labelled bisimilarity is too strong a notion of
equivalence for spi processes: It intuitively renders encryption (E·(·)) useless, by dis-
tinguishing between the (barbed equivalent) processes (νk) a〈Ek(M)〉 and
(νk) a〈Ek(N)〉 whenever M = N . This problem was adressed [3,9] by explicitly
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taking into account the knowledge of an environment about a process. Hedged
bisimularity [12], deﬁned along the same lines, is the starting point for this paper.
There is an inherent problem with the operational semantics of message-passing
process calculi: The possibility to receive arbitrary messages gives rise to an inﬁnite
number of “concrete” transitions. Using a symbolic semantics, the substitution of
received messages for input variables never takes place. Instead, an input preﬁx
produces a single “symbolic” transition, where the input variable is only indirectly
instantiated by means of constraints.
In [11], we proposed a symbolic structural operational semantics and a symbolic
bisimulation for the spi calculus. In this paper, we deﬁne decompositions [8,15]
of symbolic environments and update symbolic bisimulation to account for this,
yielding both soundness and completeness with respect to concrete bisimilarities.
Compared to work on symbolic (bisimulation) semantics [14,17] for the applied pi
calculus [2], we give a complete proof method in a setting where the operational
semantics are ﬁnitely branching.
1 The Spi calculus
The pi calculus [18] is a small language for modelling communicating and distributed
systems, where communication channels can be generated and passed around. In
contrast to the pi calculus, the spi calculus oﬀers next to mere names another kind
of transmissible messages, namely ciphertexts, which are provided by the addition of
primitive constructs to encrypt (Ek(M)) and decrypt (Dk(M)) data using shared-
key cryptography. In this paper, we generalize the message language further, per-
mitting arbitrary constructors with corresponding destructors, but not more general
equations. Apart from the extended message language, we use the same syntax and
semantics as in our original paper [11] on symbolic bisimilarity in the spi calculus.
We use the lower case letters a, b, c, k, l,m, n to range over the inﬁnite set N of
names. Names are untyped, meaning that the same name can be used as a channel,
a key or the clear-text of a message. We use x, y, z to range over the inﬁnite set V
of variables, and let u, v, w range over N ∪ V. When s1, . . . , sk−1 and sk are terms
(where k may be 0), we write “s˜” as a shorthand for “s1, . . . , sk”.
We assume a ﬁxed ﬁnite signature Σ, containing constructors f and destructors
g. While expressions F ∈ E are formed arbitrarily using both constructors and
destructors, messages M ∈ M are the expressions not containing destructor sym-
bols. There is exactly one rewrite rule for every destructor g, that is of the form
g(f(M˜), N˜)→ M ′ where M˜, N˜ don’t contain any names and M ′ ∈ {M˜, N˜}. We let
→H be rewriting at the top level of the term, and write G ≺ F iﬀ G is a subterm of
F . In keeping with the operational ﬂavor of this constructor-destructor language,
we deﬁne term evaluation as the partial function e(F ) := F↓ whenever G↓ ∈ M
for all G ≺ F , i.e., we require all destructors in F to succeed.
Logical formulae φ generalize the usual matching operator of the pi calculus by
conjunction and negation. The predicate [F :N ] tests if F evaluates to a name, so
that it can be used as a channel. The semantics [[·]] of the base predicates are as
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follows: [[[F = G ]]] is true iﬀ e(F ) = e(G) =⊥ and [[[F :N ]]] is true iﬀ e(F ) ∈ N .
Conjunction and negation have their usual meaning.
Processes P are composed of the halted process 0, the input F (x).P , output
F 〈F 〉.P and replicated input !F (x).P preﬁxes, choice P + P , parallel composition
P |P , restriction (νa)P and boolean guard φP .
F,G ::= u | f(F˜ ) | g(F˜ )
φ, ψ ::= tt | [F = F ] | [F :N ] | φ∧φ | ¬φ
P,Q ::= 0 | F (x).P | F 〈F 〉.P | !F (x).P | P + P | P |P | (νa)P | φP
The names n(·) resp. variables v(·) of a term are the names resp. variables
occuring in the term. Free and bound names and variables of process terms are
inductively deﬁned as expected: the name a is bound in “(νa)P” and the variable
x is bound in “F (x).P” and “!F (x).P”. Two processes are α-equivalent if they
can be made equal by conﬂict-free renaming of bound names and variables. We
generally identify α-equivalent processes.
Substitutions are idempotent functions
{
F/x
}
from variables x to expressions F ,
and are applied to processes, expressions and guards in the straightforward way,
obeying the usual assumption that capture of bound names and variables is avoided
through implicit α-conversion. For example, P
{
F/x
}
replaces all free occurrences
of x in P by F , renaming bound names and variables in P where needed. Below,
we give some representative transition rules for the late input semantics of the spi
calculus.
In Table 1, we give the transition rules for the late input semantics for closed
processes (fv(P ) = ∅).
Constructor-Destructor Languages
Constructor-destructor languages, as deﬁned above (cf. [7]), are subterm conver-
gent [1]. As a comparison, the data term languages of [5] constrain rewrite rules to
be of the form g(M˜) → x (where x ∈ v(M˜)), yielding a special case of (possibly
non-convergent) subterm languages.
We chose the format and unicity of the destructor rules for constructor-destructor
languages to ensure a well-deﬁned (deterministic) notion of evaluation, a smooth
extension of the notions of synthesis and analysis and a strong correspondence be-
tween the concrete and symbolic operational semantics.
Example 1.1 The nondeterministic choice rules either((x . y)) → x and
either((x . y)) → y cannot both be present in a constructor-destructor language,
but are permitted in a data term language. They also do not in general yield a
convergent rewrite system.
On the other hand, the limited inverse rule f(g(h(x))) → h(x) can be part of
a constructor destructor language (if g and h are constructors and f a destructor),
but is not permitted in a data term language.
The idempotent rule f(f(x))→ f(x) or the self-inverse rule f(f(x))→ x can be
part of a subterm-convergent rewrite system, but are not permitted in a constructor-
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(out)
e(G) = a e(F ) = M
G〈F 〉.P a〈M〉−−−→ P
(inp)
e(G) = a
G(x).P
a(x)−−→ P
(com-r)
P
(νb˜) a〈M〉−−−−−−→ P ′ Q a(x)−−→ Q′
P |Q τ−→ (νb˜) (P ′ |Q′{M/x
}) if {b˜} ∩ fn(Q) = ∅
(rep)
e(G) = a
!G(x).P
a(x)−−→ P | !G(x).P
(guard)
P
μ−→ P ′
φP
μ−→ P ′
if [[φ]]
(par-r)
Q
μ−→ Q′
P |Q μ−→ P |Q′
if bn(μ) ∩ fn(P ) = ∅ (sum-r)
Q
μ−→ Q′
P + Q
μ−→ Q′
(open)
P
(νb˜) a〈M〉−−−−−−→ P ′
(νc)P
(νcb˜) a〈M〉−−−−−−→ P ′
if
c ∈ n(M)
c ∈ {a, b˜} (res)
P
μ−→ P ′
(νc)P
μ−→ (νc)P ′
if c ∈ n(μ)
Table 1
Operational Semantics
destructor language nor a data term language.
The parameterized choice rules pick((x . y), 1) → x and pick((x . y), 2) → y
are permitted in a data term language and yield a convergent rewrite system, but
are not permitted in a constructor-destructor language (but see the deﬁnition of π1
and π2 below).
Constructor-destructor languages can express standard formal cryptography.
Example 1.2 We let ΣDY = ({E,E+,E−,H, pub, (· . ·),D,D+,D−, π1, π2}, ar) where
1 = ar(H) = ar(pub) = ar(π1) = ar(π2) and
2 = ar(E) = ar(E+) = ar(E−) = ar((· . ·)) = ar(D) = ar(D+) = ar(D−).
Here E+ (resp. E−) denotes public (private) key encryption, and D+ (D−) the
corresponding decryption. The rewrite system is given by D+y (E
+
pub(y)(x)) → x,
D−pub(y)(E
−
y (x))→ x, Dy(Ey(x))→ x, π1(x . y)→ x and π2(x . y)→ y.
2 Hedged Bisimilarity, Revisited
Hedged bisimilarity was introduced in [12] in order to clarify the diﬀerences between
other notions of environment-sensitive bisimulation for the spi calculus. For the
simpler message language used in the original paper, hedged bisimulation yielded
a sound and complete (for structurally image-ﬁnite processes) approximation of
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barbed equivalence. The basic data structure to represent the knowledge of an at-
tacker is sets of pairs of messages, called hedges. Since we compare two processes,
the message pairs in a hedge relate corresponding messages where the ﬁrst message
in a pair arises from interactions with the ﬁrst process; the second message is re-
lated to the second process. An environment is consistent if there is no noticeable
diﬀerence between the two messages of any message pair. Since we use a richer
message language than in previous work, we will also need to extend the operations
on hedges that were deﬁned there. The set of messages that can be generated using
the knowledge of a hedge is called its synthesis (S, cf. [19]). The notion of analy-
sis (A) becomes slightly more complicated in the current setting, since we do not
constrain the arguments of destructors (“keys”) to be names. Here, the rule ana
attempts to apply g to both sides of a pair in the analysis, constructing “keys” from
the material that already has been analyzed. As a compact representation targeted
towards implementations, we work with irreducible hedges (I), i.e., where no more
mutual decryptions within projections of the hedge are possible.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A hedge is a subset of E × E . The synthesis S (h) of a hedge h is
the smallest hedge containing h and satisfying the rule
(syn)
(Fj , Gj) ∈ S (h) for j ∈ {1, . . . , ar(f)}
(f(F˜ ), f(G˜)) ∈ S (h)
Let S+(h) := {(f(F˜ ), f(G˜)) | (Fj , Gj) ∈ S (h) for j ∈ {1, . . . , ar(f)}}.
The analysis A(h) of a hedge h is deﬁned by mutual induction with an auxiliary
set SA(h) by the following rules.
(ana-known)
(F,G) ∈ h
(F,G) ∈ A(h) (ana-s-known)
(F,G) ∈ A(h)
(F,G) ∈ SA(h)
(ana)
(f(F˜ ), f(G˜)) ∈ A(h)
(F ′l , G
′
l) ∈ SA(h) for l ∈ {1, . . . ar(g)− 1}
(F,G) ∈ A(h)
if g(f( eF ), eF ′) →H F
and g(f( eG), eG′) →H G
(ana-s)
(Fj , Gj) ∈ SA(h) for j ∈ {1, . . . , ar(f)}
(f(F˜ ), f(G˜)) ∈ SA(h)
The irreducibles I (·) of a hedge are deﬁned as I (h) := A(h) \ S+(A(h)).
If S is a set of expressions, we let IdS = {(F, F ) | F ∈ S}. We write h  F ↔ G
for (F,G) ∈ S (h). If h is a hedge, we let ht := { (G,F ) | (F,G) ∈ h } and
πi(h) := {Fi | (F1, F2) ∈ h } when i ∈ {1, 2}. A hedge h is irreducible iﬀ h = I (h).
The only purpose of the set SA is to ensure that A(h) is well-founded. If we
replaced SA(h) by S (A(h)) in ana the deﬁnition would no longer be inductive,
since we would a priori need to argue about the presence of certain expression pairs
in A(h) before applying the rule. Indeed, for all hedges h, SA(h) = S (A(h)).
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Example 2.2 We work with the constructor-destructor language ΣDY and let h =
{(pub(k), pub(k)), (E−k ((n . m)),E−k ((n . n))), (E−k (n),E−l (n))}.
Applying Deﬁnition 2.1 to h with this language, we get
A(h) = h ∪ {((n . m), (n . n)), (n,m), (n, n)} and I (h) = h ∪ {(n,m), (n, n)}.
In order to deﬁne a notion of consistency for concrete hedges, we use the notion
of a pattern for a rewrite rule, intuitively a more abstract version of the left-hand
side of the rule. As an extension of patterns, σ-patterns also track the possibilities
to generate subterms of messages in range(σ) (cf. [1]).
Deﬁnition 2.3 An expression g(M˜) is a pattern if there is ρ : V → (M\ V) with
g(M˜)ρ = F , where F is the left-hand side of the rewrite rule for g.
If g(M˜) is a pattern and σ, ρ : V ⇀ M, then g(M˜ρ) is a σ-pattern whenever
range(ρ) ⊆ {M ∈ V | n(M) = ∅ ∧ v(M) ⊆ dom(σ) ∧ ∃N ∈ range(σ) Mσ ≺ N}.
Example 2.4 Modulo renaming of variables, the patterns for our example rewrite
system are π1(x), π2(x), Dy(x), D
+
y (x), D
−
y (x), D
+
x (E
+
z (y)), D
−
x (E
−
z (y)) and D
−
pub(x)(y).
A hedge is consistent if, inuitively, the same operations performed on both sides
give indistinguishable results. Here, we give a more operational deﬁnition of this
condition 2 .
Deﬁnition 2.5 We denote by H = Pﬁn(M ×M) the set of all ﬁnite concrete
hedges. An irreducible hedge h ∈ H is left consistent iﬀ
(i) if (a,N) ∈ h with a ∈ N then N ∈ N ; and
(ii) if (M,N), (M ′, N ′) ∈ h such that M = M ′ then N = N ′; and
(iii) if (M,N) ∈ h there is no N ′ with (M,N ′) ∈ S+(h); and
(iv) Take σ1, σ2 with h = {(σ1(x), σ2(x)) | x ∈ dom(σ1)} and
dom(σ1) = dom(σ2). If g(M˜) is a σ1-pattern and there is N1 such that
g(M˜)σ1 → N1 then there is N2 such that g(M˜)σ2 → N2.
h is consistent iﬀ h and ht are both left consistent.
Since there are only ﬁnitely many σ-patterns (up to renaming) for any given σ,
consistency is decidable.
Example 2.6 Continuing Example 2.2, we let
h = {(pub(k), pub(k)), (E−k ((n . m)),E−k ((n . n))), (E−k (n),E−l (n))},
h′ = I (h) = h ∪ {(n, n), (n,m)} and h′′ = I (h′ ∪ {(k, k)}).
Then h′ violates condition 2 for consistency since {(n, n), (n,m)} ⊂ h′. h′ also
violates condition 4 for consistency since (E−k (n),E
−
l (n)) ∈ h′ and E−k (n), but
not E−l (n), can be decrypted by pub(k). Moreover, h
′′ violates condition 3, since
(E−k (n),E
−
l (n)) ∈ h′′ and (E−k (n),E−k (n)) ∈ S+(h′′).
Now that the environment and notions of consistency are deﬁned, the deﬁnition
of hedged bisimulation is straightforward. A hedged relation R is a subset of H ×
2 For a logical characterization of hedge consistency, see Chapter 3 of [10].
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P × P, where we write h  P R Q for (h, P,Q) ∈ R. We say that R is consistent
if h  P R Q implies that h is consistent.
Deﬁnition 2.7 A consistent hedged relation R is a hedged simulation if whenever
h  P R Q we have that
(i) If P τ−→ P ′ then there exists Q′ such that Q τ−→ Q′ and h  P ′ R Q′.
(ii) If there are a, b, x,B,M,N, P ′ such that P
a(x)−−→ P ′, h  a ↔ b, B ⊂ N is
ﬁnite, B ∩ (fn(P,Q) ∪ n(h)) = ∅, M,N ∈ M, and h ∪ IdB  M ↔ N , then
there exists Q′ such that Q
b(x)−−→ Q′ and h ∪ IdB  P ′
{
M/x
} R Q′{N/x
}
.
(iii) If there are a, b, c˜,M, P ′ such that P
(νc˜) a〈M〉−−−−−−→ P ′, h  a ↔ b and {c˜}∩(fn(P )∪
n(π1(h))) = ∅ there are Q′, N, d˜ with {d˜} ∩ (fn(Q) ∪ n(π2(h))) = ∅
such that Q
(νd˜) b〈N〉−−−−−−→ Q′ and I (h ∪ {(M,N)})  P ′ R Q′.
R is a hedged bisimulation if both R and R−1 are hedged simulations. We write
∼h for the union of all hedged bisimulations.
On process output we use I (·) to construct the new hedge after the transition.
This entails applying all decryptions that the environment can do, producing the
minimal extension of the hedge h with (M,N). This extension may turn out to be
inconsistent, signifying that the environment has detected a diﬀerence between the
messages received from the process pair.
3 Symbolic Semantics
The idea behind the symbolic operational semantics, as previously described in [11],
is to record the necessary conditions for a transition as it is derived. A symbolic
transition is written P
μs−→
φ
P ′, where μs ∈ {(νc˜) τ, (νc˜)G(x), (νc˜)G〈F 〉} and φ is the
accumulated conditions for the transition. We let bv(a(x)) := {x} and bn((νc˜) τ) :=
bn((νc˜)G〈F 〉) := bn((νc˜)G(x)) := {c˜}.
Due to the more general message language than in [11], we here introduce a two-
stage semantics, where the second stage is responsible for closing the restrictions
of names that will only be present in the transition guard. We begin by deﬁning
the ﬁrst stage as a SOS (Table 2). Compared to the concrete semantics, we simply
record the sideconditions for the transition in the rules (Sout) and (Sinp). We do
not close the resulting process term after a communication in the rule (Scom-r),
since the expression that is communicated may contain fresh names that are not
extruded in any corresponding concrete transition (cf. Example 3.1).
We intend to use the symbolic semantics to verify if certain assignments to in-
put variables, represented by a substitution σ, enable a concrete transition. We do
this by comparing the eﬀects of applying the substitution before and after a tran-
sition, both on the resulting processes and the transition constraints. However, the
single-stage semantics are not suﬃcient for this purpose, as we see in the following
examples.
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(Sout) G〈F 〉.P G〈F 〉−−−−−−−−−−→
[G :N ]∧[F :M ]
P (Sinp) G(x).P
G(x)−−−−→
[G :N ]
P
(Srep) !G(x).P
G(x)−−−−→
[G :N ]
P | !G(x).P
(Scom-r)
P
(νb˜)G〈F 〉−−−−−−→
φ1
P ′ Q
(νc˜)G′(x)−−−−−−→
φ2
Q′
P |Q (νb˜c˜) τ−−−−−−−−−−→
φ1∧φ2∧[G=G′ ]
P ′ |Q′{F/x
}
if {c˜} ∩ fn(P ) = ∅
and {b˜} ∩ fn(Q) = ∅
and {c˜} ∩ {b˜} = ∅
(Spar-r)
Q
μs−→
φ
Q′
P |Q μs−→
φ
P |Q′
if (bn(μs)) ∩ fn(P ) = ∅ (Ssum-r)
Q
μs−→
φ
Q′
P + Q
μs−→
φ
Q′
(Sres)
P
μs−→
φ
P ′
(νa)P
μs−→
φ
(νa)P ′
if a ∈ n(μs) ∪ n(φ) (Sguard)
P
μs−→
φ
P ′
φ′P μs−−−→
φ∧φ′
P ′
(Sopen)
P
μs−→
φ
P ′
(νa)P
(νa)μs−−−−→
φ
P ′
if (fn(μs) ∪ n(φ))  a ∈ bn(μs)
Table 2
Symbolic Operational Semantics
Firstly, the resulting processes after concrete resp. symbolic transitions diﬀer in
which names are restricted.
Example 3.1 Let P := (νb) a〈π1(a . b)〉.P ′ for some P ′. Concretely,
P
a〈a〉−−→ (νb)P ′. Symbolically we have that P (νb) a〈π1(a . b)〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[ a :N ]∧[π1(a . b) :M ]
P ′, where the
processes after the step only diﬀer in the restriction of the name b. Also note that
the scope of the binder for b in the symbolic transition extends to both the transition
constraint and the resulting process.
Secondly, the symbolic semantics allow the communication of non-message terms,
which after substitution need to be evaluated to coincide with the messages that
are communicated in the concrete semantics.
Example 3.2 Now consider Q := a〈π1(x)〉 | a(y).a〈y〉. We can derive
Q
τ−→
φ
0 | a〈π1(x)〉 =: Q′ with φ := [ a :N ]∧[π1(x) :M ]∧[ a :N ]∧[ a = a ].
We do not have [[φ]], but the substitution σ :=
{
(a . a)/x
}
enables the transition.
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Concretely, Q
{
(a . a)/x
} τ−→ 0 | a〈a〉, but 0 | a〈a〉 = 0 | a〈π1(a . a)〉 = Q′σ.
As seen in Example 3.1, the symbolic semantics may extrude the scope of more
names than the concrete semantics. However, when working with a constructor-
destructor expression language, we can compute exactly which names would be
extruded by the concrete semantics, using a notion of “abstract evaluation”. This
abstract evaluation, ea : E → E , intuitively reduces a term wherever possible,
without checking that e.g. decryption and encryption keys correspond.
Deﬁnition 3.3 We deﬁne →A as follows: For each g, if g(f(M˜), N˜) →H M ′, x˜, y˜
are pairwise diﬀerent, σ =
{
fM/
ex
}{
eN/
ey
}
and M ′ = σ(z), then g(f(x˜), y˜) →A z. We
then let ea(F )
def= F↓A.
We let the extruded names of an expression en(F ) be deﬁned inductively by
en(a) = {a}, en(x) = ∅, en(g(G˜)) = ∅ and en(fi(G˜)) = ∪j en(Gj).
Example 3.4 Let F := π1(x) and σ :=
{
(a . a)/x
}
. We have
ea(F ) = π1(x), ea(F )σ = π1(a . a) and ea(Fσ) = a.
We then have e(F ) = ea(F ) for all F ∈ dom(e), or in other words, ea extends
e to the entire set of expressions. Moreover, abstract evaluation commutes with
substitution (modulo concrete evaluation). Using abstract evaluation, we deﬁne a
version of the symbolic transition system that adds back restrictions to the resulting
process, yielding a stronger correspondence.
Deﬁnition 3.5 We deﬁne the transition relation
μs−→
φ
s by
CDtau
P
(νb˜) τ−−−→
φ
P ′
P
(νb˜) τ−−−→
φ
s (νb˜)P ′
CDinp
P
(νb˜)F (x)−−−−−→
φ
P ′
P
(νb˜)F (x)−−−−−→
φ
s (νb˜)P ′
if {b˜} ∩ en(ea(F )) = ∅
CDout
P
(νc˜)F 〈G〉−−−−−−→
φ
P ′
P
(νc˜)F 〈G〉−−−−−−→
φ
s (νb˜)P ′
if b˜ are pair-wise diﬀerent
and {b˜} = {c˜} \ en(ea(G))
and {c˜} ∩ en(ea(F )) = ∅
Note that all restrictions are put back at the top level. To cope with this, as
well as with the problems outlined in Example 3.2, we introduce the partial order
>a (“more abstract than”), which would be a subset of structural equivalence in an
applied pi-style semantics [2].
Deﬁnition 3.6 We let >a be the least reﬂexive and transitive precongruence on
expressions, guards and processes satisfying
(i) F >a M whenever e(F ) = M ; and
(ii) (νa) (νb)P >a (νb) (νa)P ; and
(iii) (νa) (P |Q) >a ((νa)P ) |Q when a ∈ fn(Q); and
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(iv) (νa) (P |Q) >a P | ((νa)Q) when a ∈ fn(P ).
Example 3.7 Relating the eﬀects of substituting before and after the transition in
Example 3.2, we have Q′σ = (0 | a〈π1((a . a))〉.0) >a (0 | a〈a〉.0).
The relation >a is a (concrete) labelled bisimulation.
Lemma 3.8 If P >a Q then
(i) If P
μ−→ P ′ then there is Q′ such that Q μ−→ Q′ and P ′ >a Q′; and
(ii) if Q
μ−→ Q′ such that bn(μ) ∩ fn(P ) = ∅ then there is P ′ such that P μ−→ P ′ and
P ′ >a Q′; and
(iii) Pσ >a Qσ for all substitutions σ : V ⇀ M.
Theorem 3.9
(i) If P
μs−→
φ
s P1 and σ is idempotent and satisﬁes n(range(σ))∩ bn(μs) = ∅, [[φσ]]
and μ := e(μsσ) is deﬁned, then there is P2 with Pσ
μ−→ P2 and P1σ >a P2.
(ii) If σ is idempotent and Pσ
μ−→ P1 with n(range(σ)) ∩ bn(μ) = ∅ then there are
φ, μs, P2 such μ = e(μsσ), [[φσ]], P
μs−→
φ
s P2 and P2σ >a P1.
We now have a symbolic operational semantics that is sound and complete with
respect to the concrete one (modulo >a, which is a labelled bisimulation) and is
ﬁnitely branching (modulo choices of bound names and variables).
3.1 Symbolic Environments
A symbolic environment is a concise description of a set of hedges, diﬀering only in
the instantiations of variables. Here, a variable instantiation is a pair of substitu-
tions, that must respect the symbolic environment. The hedges that we get from
instantiating variables in an environment-respecting way are called concretizations.
The symbolic environments used in this paper are very similar to the ones in [11],
with the only diﬀerence that we keep explicit track of fresh names. A symbolic
environment consists of the following three elements.
(i) A timed hedge th : E × E ⇀ N containing pairs of messages considered equal
by the environment and the time they were received.
(ii) A timed variable set tv : V ⇀ N+ containing input variables and the time they
were input.
(iii) A pair of restricted formulae ((νC)φ, (νD)ψ) representing the accumulated
transition constraints and sets of fresh names.
As mentioned above, the original version of symbolic environments did not include
C and D; they facilitate environment decomposition (Def. 3.15).
Deﬁnition 3.10 We write se for the environment (th, tv, ((νC)φ, (νD)ψ)). By
abuse of notation, we write φ for (ν∅)φ and (νa)φ for (ν{a})φ in environments.
We let tht := {(F,G)→th(G,F ) | (G,F ) ∈ dom(th)} in order to swap the sides of a
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timed hedge. We let n1(se) := n(π1(dom(th)))∪C∪n(φ), n2(se) := n(π2(dom(th)))∪
D ∪ n(ψ) and n(se) := n1(se) ∪ n2(se).
Intuitively, if the environment knows the pair (F,G) it must have learned about
it with the help of the processes at time th(F,G); if this pair contains an input
variable x, then the process must have performed this input at the strictly earlier
time tv(x).
Deﬁnition 3.11 The environment se is well-formed if dom(th) is ﬁnite,
0 ∈ range(th), v(range(th), φ, ψ) ⊆ dom(tv), and whenever (F,G) ∈ dom(th) such
that x ∈ v(F,G) then tv(x) < th(F,G).
From here on we only consider well-formed symbolic environments, the set of
which is denoted SE. By instantiating the input variables of the symbolic envi-
ronment, we can get a concrete (non-timed) hedge. However, such an instantiation
must be subject to several constraints, e.g., timing, guard satisfaction and freshness
of invented names. For instance, an input performed at time t must be synthesizable
from the knowledge of the environment at that time. Similarly to the symbolic early
input semantics, we deﬁne environment respectfulness for substitutions. Naturally,
with the bisimulation environments we need two (possibly diﬀerent) substitutions,
one for each process. We also create some fresh names B.
Deﬁnition 3.12 A substitution pair (σ, ρ) is se-respecting with B ⊆ N , written
se  σ ↔B ρ iﬀ (i) to (iv) below hold.
(i) dom(σ) = dom(ρ) = dom(tv)
(ii) [[φσ]] and [[ψρ]]
(iii) if tv(x) = t then (σ(x), ρ(x)) ∈ S (I ({(Fσ↓, Gρ↓) | th(F,G) ≤ t} ∪ IdB))
(iv) B is fresh and minimal in the sense that (n(range(th)) ∪ C ∪D) ∩ B = ∅ and
if a ∈ B then a ∈ n(range(σ)) or a ∈ n(range(ρ)).
If se  σ ↔B ρ we can concretize the knowledge th of the symbolic environment
se by letting CBσ,ρ(th) := I ({(e(Fσ), e(Gρ)) | (F,G) ∈ dom(th)} ∪ IdB).
In condition iii of the above deﬁnition we use Fσ↓ rather than e(Fσ) since the latter
may be undeﬁned. Indeed, CBσ,ρ(th) may be undeﬁned, signifying that a received
message was in fact a non-message expression. This cannot happen when using the
symbolic semantics, since the requirement for the transmitted expression to be a
message is always added to the transition constraint. This yields a concretizable
symbolic environment (deﬁned below), that always has well deﬁned concretizations.
Example 3.13 Let th := {(x, x) → 2}, tv := {x → 1} and
σ := ρ :=
{
Ea(a)/x
}
. Then we have (th, tv, (tt , tt))  σ ↔{a} ρ, and
C{a}σ,ρ (th) = {(a, a)} is consistent. If the deﬁnition of C··,·(·) did not use I (·), then
C{a}σ,ρ (th) = {(Ea(a),Ea(a)), (a, a)} would not be consistent.
Since the se-respecting substitution pairs describe all admissible (with respect to the
knowledge and constraints of se) instantiations of input variables, it is interesting
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to apply all of them to a pair of formulae (e.g., transition constraints) and study
the results. If the formulae are only satisﬁed simultaneously, they are equivalent
from the point of view of the environment. For an environment to be consistent,
we require any concretization of its knowledge to be a consistent hedge. We also
require that the accumulated constraints are satisﬁed simultaneously on both sides
(the second condition below).
Deﬁnition 3.14 We write se  φ′ ⇔ ψ′ if for all B, σ, ρ : se  σ ↔B ρ im-
plies that [[φ′σ]] iﬀ [[ψ′ρ]]. se is concretizable if when (F,G) ∈ dom(th) we have
se  [F :M ]⇔ tt and se  tt ⇔ [G :M ].
A concretizable symbolic environment se is consistent if CBσ,ρ(th) is consistent
whenever se  σ ↔B ρ, and (th, tv, ((νC) tt , (νD) tt))  φ ⇔ ψ.
Note that if se is concretizable and se  σ ↔B ρ then CBσ,ρ(th) is always deﬁned
and σ and ρ are both idempotent.
When simulating a transition, we often need to consider diﬀerent cases. In order
to split a symbolic environment according to these cases, we may decompose the
constraints [8,15]. Since we keep constraints for both sides of the environment we
may require that the split is consistent, following [17].
Deﬁnition 3.15 Let se = (th, tv, ((νC)φ, (νD)ψ)) be a concretizable symbolic
environment. The set {sei}i∈I is a decomposition of se if each sei is of the form
(th, tv, ((νC)φi, (νD)ψi), and whenever se  σ ↔B ρ there is i ∈ I such that
sei  σ ↔B ρ. A decomposition {sei}i∈I is concretizable/consistent if each sei is
concretizable/consistent.
Example 3.16 Let seφ := ({(a, a) → 0}, {x → 1}, (φ, φ)). {se[x=a ], se¬[x=a ]} is a
decomposition of sett . Moreover, {se} is a decomposition of any se.
We can fully decompose a consistent environment into an inﬁnite set of environ-
ments with unique solutions as follows.
Lemma 3.17 Let se = (th, tv, ((νC)φ, (νD)ψ)) be a consistent environment and
I = {(σ, ρ,B) | se  σ ↔B ρ}. Then {se(σ,ρ,B)}(σ,ρ,B)∈I where
φ(σ,ρ,B) =
∧
x∈dom(tv)[x = σ(x) ] and ψ(σ,ρ,B) =
∧
x∈dom(tv)[x = ρ(x) ]
is a decomposition of se.
Moreover, for each (σ, ρ,B) ∈ I, se(σ,ρ,B)  σ′ ↔B ′ ρ′ iﬀ (σ′, ρ′, B′) = (σ, ρ,B).
In the pi calculus, it is always suﬃcient to consider a ﬁnite number of cases in
the decomposition [8]. However, in a spi calculus an inﬁnite split may be needed
when treating processes with replication.
Example 3.18 We take a simple expression language that allows us to encode
integers. Let Σ = ({s, p}, {s → 1, p → 1}) with the rewrite rule p(s(x)) → x.
This language is a constructor-destructor language, and would also be admissible
as a data term language. We write na for the message sn(a).
We deﬁne processes P and Q with the same behavior (i.e., P ∼ Q where ∼ is
strong labelled bisimulation, as commonly deﬁned). Upon input of a message na,
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P non-deterministically decides to diverge or to perform an output on a after n
more steps. On the other hand, upon input of na Q non-deterministically decides
to become either Q1 or Q2, where Q1 performs an output on a after n steps if n is
odd and diverges if n is even, while Q2 performs an output on a after n steps if n
is even and diverges if n is odd.
P = a(x).Ω+ a(x).(νc) (P ′(x) | !c(y).P ′(y))
P ′(x) = x〈a〉+ c〈p(x)〉
Q= (νc) ((a(x).Q1(x) + a(x).Q2(x)) | !c(y).Q2(y))
Q1(x) = [x :N ]Ω + c〈p(x)〉
Q2(x) = x〈a〉+ (νd) (d〈p(x)〉 | d(z).Q1(z))
Ω= (νc) (c〈c〉 | !c(z).c〈c〉)
After the choice of the ﬁrst process we need to make a choice in the second process,
dependent on whether n is even or odd. Symbolically, in order to make the choice
in the second process we need to describe the condition “n is even (odd)” using
a disjunction of formulas. We conjecture that this cannot be done with a ﬁnite
disjunction (of ﬁnite formulas) in this guard and expression language.
The question then arises if it would be possible to extend the logical language
used in environments to always enable a ﬁnite decomposition. However, a more
sophisticated version of this example would use that the (ﬁnite-control) spi calculus
is Turing-complete [16]. We could then let P receive an encoding of a Turing
machine and its input and choose between diverging or simulating the machine,
signalling failure or success upon termination. Q would make an initial choice
and simulate the machine in both cases, diverging on failure (resp. success) and
signalling success (resp. failure). A ﬁnite decomposition would then require a ﬁnite
disjunction representing the predicate
“t ∈ {(M . N) where M codes for a Turing machine that accepts (rejects) N}”.
This is clearly also an issue for automated veriﬁcation. However, in our experiments
with simple security protocols we have not had use for any decomposition, suggesting
that the actual impact of this issue is highly domain-dependent.
3.2 Symbolic Bisimulation
In [11], we deﬁned a notion of symbolic bisimulation that was sound with respect to
hedged (concrete) bisimulation, and thus with respect to barbed equivalence. In this
section, we extend this deﬁnition with environment decompositions, also yielding
completeness. The main ingredient of this deﬁnition is the symbolic environments
seen above, that keep track of the accumulated transition constraints and the time
relationships between inputs and outputs in order to make a proper accounting of
the knowledge of the adversary.
A symbolic relation R is a subset of SE × P × P. We write se  P R Q
for (se, P,Q) ∈ R. R is symmetric if whenever se  P R Q we have that
(tht, tvt, ((νD)ψ, (νC)φ))  Q R P . R is consistent if se is consistent and
fv(P,Q) ⊆ dom(tv) whenever se  P R Q.
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Intuitively, for two processes to be bisimilar under a given environment every
possible and detectable transition of one of the processes must yield a decomposition
of the resulting environment such that every element in the decomposition has a
simulating transition of the other process on a corresponding channel such that the
updated environment is consistent. The consistency of the updated environment
implies that the simulating transition is also possible and detectable.
Deﬁnition 3.19 A symmetric consistent symbolic relation R is a symbolic bisim-
ulation if whenever se  P R Q with se = (th, tv, ((νC)φ, (νD)ψ)) and t =
max(range(th) ∪ range(tv)) then
• If P
(νc˜) τ−−−→
φ′
s P
′ with {c˜} ∩ n1(se) = ∅, and there are σ, ρ,B with se  σ ↔B ρ,
[[φ′σ]] and ({c˜} ∪ fn(P,Q)) ∩B = ∅,
then there is a decomposition {sei}i∈I of (th, tv, ((νC ∪ {c˜})φ ∧ φ′, (νD)ψ))
such that for each i ∈ I, there are {e˜}, ψ′, Q′ with Q (νe˜) τ−−−→
ψ′
s Q
′,
{e˜} ∩ (n2(se) ∪ B) = ∅ and (th, tv, ((νC ∪ {c˜})φi, (νD ∪ {e˜})ψi))  tt ↔ ψ′.
Finally, we require (th, tv, ((νC ∪ {c˜})φi, (νD ∪ {e˜})ψi))  P ′ R Q′.
• If P
(νc˜)F (x)−−−−−→
φ′
s P
′ with {c˜} ∩ n1(se) = ∅ and x ∈ dom(tv), and there are σ, ρ,B
with se  σ ↔B ρ, [[φ′σ]], e(Fσ) ∈ π1(CBσ,ρ(th)) and ({c˜} ∪ fn(P,Q)) ∩B = ∅,
then there are y ∈ (dom(tv) ∪ {x}) and a decomposition {sei}i∈I of
(th, tv′, ((νC ∪ {c˜})φ ∧ φ′ ∧ [ y = F ], (νD)ψ)) where
tv′ = tv ∪ {x → t+1, y → t+1}
such that for each i ∈ I, there are {e˜}, ψ′, Q′, F ′ with Q (νe˜)F
′(x)−−−−−−→
ψ′
s Q
′,
{e˜} ∩ (n2(se) ∪B) = ∅ and
(th, tv′, ((νC ∪ {c˜})φi, (νD ∪ {e˜})ψi))  tt ↔ ψ′ ∧ [ y = F ′ ]. Finally, we require
(th, tv′, ((νC ∪ {c˜})φi, (νD ∪ {e˜})ψi))  P ′ R Q′.
• If P
(νc˜)F 〈G〉−−−−−−→
φ′
s P
′ with {c˜} ∩ n1(se) = ∅, and
there are σ, ρ,B with se  σ ↔B ρ, [[φ′σ]], e(Fσ) ∈ π1(CBσ,ρ(th)), x ∈ dom(tv)
and ({c˜} ∪ fn(P,Q)) ∩B = ∅,
then there are y ∈ dom(tv) and a decomposition {sei}i∈I of
(th, tv′, ((νC ∪ {c˜})φ ∧ φ′ ∧ [ y = F ], (νD)ψ)) where tv′ = tv ∪ {y → t+1}
such that for each i ∈ I, there are {e˜}, ψ′, Q′, F ′, G′ with Q (νe˜)F
′〈G〉′−−−−−−−→
ψ′
s Q
′,
{e˜} ∩ (n2(se) ∪B) = ∅ and
(th ′, tv′, ((νC ∪ {c˜})φi, (νD ∪ {e˜})ψi))  tt ↔ ψ′ ∧ [ y = F ′ ] where
th ′ = th ∪ {(G,G′) → i+1} if G,G′ ∈ dom(th), th ′ = th otherwise.
Then (th ′, tv′, ((νC ∪ {c˜})φi, (νD ∪ {e˜})ψi))  P ′ R Q′.
Symbolic bisimilarity, written ∼s, is the union of all symbolic bisimulations.
Symbolic bisimilarity is sound with respect to concrete bisimilarity. The struc-
ture of the soundness proof was described in [11], details can be found in [10].
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Theorem 3.20 For all processes P,Q, and symbolic environments se such that
se  P ∼s Q we have that CBσ,ρ(se)  Pσ ∼h Qρ for all B ⊂ N with fn(P,Q)∩B = ∅
and substitution pairs (σ, ρ) satisfying se  σ ↔B ρ.
By virtue of allowing decompositions, symbolic bisimilarity is complete with
respect to concrete hedged bisimilarity.
Theorem 3.21 Assume that se, P,Q are such that se is consistent and
CBσ,ρ(se)  Pσ ∼h Qρ whenever se  σ ↔B ρ with B ∩ fn(P,Q) = ∅. Then
se  P ∼s Q.
Proof. The set R = {(se, P,Q) | se is consistent and CBσ,ρ(se)  Pσ ∼h Qρ
whenever se  σ ↔B ρ with B ∩ fn(P,Q) = ∅} is a symbolic bisimulation. The
proof uses Lemma 3.17 at every transition. 
4 Examples
The processes in the following examples are taken from [11], where they were given
as examples of the incompleteness of the earlier version of symbolic bisimilarity
(lacking distinctions) proposed in that paper. All these examples start from the
same symbolic environment se := ({(a, a) → 0}, ∅, (tt , tt)). Since se has no vari-
ables, it has the unique solution h := C∅	,	({(a, a) → 0}) = {(a, a)}. We assume that
x, y, z, a, k, n are pair-wise diﬀerent wherever they occur below. The ﬁrst example
shows how decompositions permit a simple case split.
Example 4.1 Let P1 := a(x).a〈a〉 and Q1 := a(x).Q′1 with
Q′1 := ([x = a ]a〈a〉 + ¬[x = a ]a〈a〉). Then se  P1 ∼s Q1. Speciﬁcally, the
symmetric closure of the set
R := {(se, P1, Q1), (se1, a〈a〉, Q′1), (se2,0,0), (se3,0,0) | x, y, z ∈ V} where
se1 := ({(a, a) → 0}, {x → 1, y → 1}, ([ y = a ], [ y = a ]))
se2 := ({(a, a) → 0}, {x → 1, y → 1, z → 2}, ([x = a ] ∧ [ y = a ] ∧ [ z = a ],
[x = a ] ∧ [ y = a ] ∧ [ z = a ]))
se3 := ({(a, a) → 0}, {x → 1, y → 1, z → 2}, ((¬[x = a ]) ∧ [ y = a ] ∧ [ z = a ],
(¬[x = a ]) ∧ [ y = a ] ∧ [ z = a ]))
is a symbolic bisimulation. We consider (se1, a〈a〉, Q′1). The symbolic transition
P
a〈a〉−−−−−−−−−→
[ a :N ]∧[a :M ] s
0 is possible and detectable: Letting σ =
{
a/x
}{
a/y
}
we have
se1  σ ↔∅ σ, a ∈ π1(C∅σ,σ(se1)) = {a} and [[([ a :N ] ∧ [a :M ])σ]].
We choose {se2, se3} as a decomposition of ({(a, a) → 0}, {x → 1, y → 1, z →
2}, ([ y = a ]∧ [ a :N ]∧ [a :M ]∧ [ z = a ], [ y = a ])): se2 and se3 are both consistent
since they are symmetric, and for all ρ : {x, y, z} → M we have either [[[x = a ]ρ]]
or [[¬[x = a ]ρ]].
Considering se2, Q′2
a〈a〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[ a :N ]∧[a :M ]∧[x=a ] s
0 where trivially
se2  tt ↔ [ a :N ] ∧ [a :M ] ∧ [x = a ] ∧ [ z = a ].
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Similarly, Q′2
a〈a〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[ a :N ]∧[a :M ]∧¬[x=a ] s
0 with
se3  tt ↔ [ a :N ] ∧ [a :M ] ∧ (¬[x = a ]) ∧ [ z = a ].
In general, symbolic bisimulations let us postpone the “instantiation” of input
variables until the moment they are actually used. In the following example, the
variable x is instead constrained through use of decomposition.
Example 4.2 Let
P2 := a(x).P ′2 P
′
2 := (νc) (c〈c〉 | c(z) | c(z).[x = a ]a〈a〉)
Q2 := a(x).Q′2 Q
′
2 := (νc) (c〈c〉 | c(z) | [x = a ]c(z).a〈a〉).
Then se  P2 ∼s Q2. Similarly to before, the symmetric closure of the set
R := {(se, P1, Q1)}
∪{(se1, a〈a〉, Q′1) | x, y ∈ V}
∪{(se2,0,0 | ¬[x = a ]a〈a〉) | x, y, z ∈ V}
∪{(se3,0, [x = a ]a〈a〉 | 0) | x, y, z ∈ V}
where
se1 := ({(a, a) → 0}, {x → 1, y → 2}, ([ y = a ], [ y = a ]))
se2 := ({(a, a) → 0}, {x → 1, y → 2, z → 3}, ([x = a ] ∧ [ y = a ] ∧ [ z = a ],
[x = a ] ∧ [ y = a ] ∧ [ z = a ]))
se3 := ({(a, a) → 0}, {x → 1, y → 2, z → 3}, ((¬[x = a ]) ∧ [ y = a ] ∧ [ z = a ],
(¬[x = a ]) ∧ [ y = a ] ∧ [ z = a ]))
is a symbolic bisimulation.
Orthogonally to the possibility to decompose, the symbolic bisimilarity now also
imposes the necessary and suﬃcient constraints for the environment to detect the
process action.
Example 4.3 Let
P3 := a(x).(νk) a〈Ek(x)〉.(νn) a〈EEk(a)(n)〉.n〈a〉
Q3 := a(x).(νk) a〈Ek(x)〉.(νn) a〈EEk(a)(n)〉.[x = a ]n〈a〉.
Then se  P3 ∼s Q3: After the ﬁrst three transitions we have the symbolically
hedged process pair (se′, n〈a〉, [x = a ]n〈a〉) where
se′ := (th ′, tv′, ((ν{k})φ′, (ν{k})φ′)
th ′ := ({(a, a) → 0, (Ek(x),Ek(x)) → 2, (EEk(a)(n),EEk(a)(n)) → 3}
tv′ := {x → 1, y1 → 1, y2 → 2, y3 → 3}
φ′ := [ y1 = a ] ∧ [ y2 = a ] ∧ [ y3 = a ]
The symbolic transitions of n〈a〉 and [x = a ]n〈a〉 are
n〈a〉 n〈a〉−−−−−−−−−→
[n :N ]∧[a :M ] s
0 [x = a ]n〈a〉 n〈a〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[n :N ]∧[a :M ]∧[x=a ] s
0
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Let σ :=
{
a/x
}
. As se′  σ ↔∅ σ and C∅σ,σ(th ′) = {(a, a), (Ek(a),Ek(a)), (n, n)},
we have that n ∈ π1(C∅σ,σ(th ′))), so the transition of n〈a〉 must be simulated by
[x = a ]n〈a〉. The environment after the step is
se′′ := (th ′, tv′ ∪ {z → 5}, ((ν{k, n})φ′ ∧ [ z = n ], (ν{k, n})φ′ ∧ [ z = n ])).
We need to show that se′′  tt ↔ [n :N ] ∧ [a :M ] ∧ [x = a ], i.e., that ρ′(x) = a
whenever se′′  σ′ ↔B ρ′. First note that [[(φ′ ∧ [ z = n ])ρ]] iﬀ
a = ρ(y1) = ρ(y2) = ρ(y3) and ρ(z) = n; we let ρ =
{
a/y1
}{
a/y2
}{
a/y3
}{
n/z
}
.
Assume that σ′ =
{
M/x
}
and ρ′ =
{
N/x
}
such that se′′  ρσ′ ↔B ρρ′. We let
h′ = {(a, a), (Ek(M),Ek(N)), (EEk(a)(n),EEk(a)(n))}. In order to have ρ(z) = n we
must have (n, n) ∈ S (CBρσ′,ρρ′(th ′)) = S (I (h′ ∪ IdB)). Since {k, n} is restricted we
cannot have k, n ∈ B.
Then the only way to derive (n, n) ∈ A(h′ ∪ IdB) is by generating
(Ek(a),Ek(a)) ∈ SA(h′ ∪ IdB) to analyze (EEk(a)(n),EEk(a)(n)). Since we cannot
derive (k, k) ∈ SA(h′ ∪ IdB) we must have (Ek(a),Ek(a)) ∈ A(h′ ∪ IdB). This is
the case iﬀ M = a = N , yielding σ′ =
{
a/x
}
= ρ′.
Finally, se′′ is concretizable since dom(th ′) ⊂M×M and consistent since it is
symmetric.
5 Conclusions
We have given a smooth extension of the message algebra of the spi calculus, treating
complex keys and public-key cryptography in a uniform fashion. We have also
extended our pre-existing notion of symbolic bisimilarity for the spi calculus [11],
making it sound and complete with respect to concrete hedged bisimilarity.
However, the issues of ﬁnding appropriate decompositions and deciding symbolic
consistency still remain. A promising step in this direction is due to Baudet [6],
who studied the symbolic consistency problem in the setting of subterm-convergent
rewrite theories, giving an NP algorithm for symbolic consistency for the case of
guards without disjunction and negation.
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